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TITLE IX: NO LONGER AN EMPTY PROMISE-
CANNON V. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
Congress, responding to evidence of sex discrimination in education, en-
acted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX). 1 Discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender is thereby prohibited in educational programs
receiving federal funds. 2 The statute provides for an administrative rem-
edy, but it does not expressly grant a private right of action.3 In such
cases, courts historically have found a civil cause of action to have been
implied by the legislature.4 Commentators have criticized the inference of
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1681-1683 (1976).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976) states:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ....
Title IX does not apply, however, to private undergraduate institutions, public undergraduate
institutions with a continually enforced single-sex admissions program, religious institutions, and
military institutions.
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 states:
"Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or
contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed
to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 with respect to such program or activity
by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consist-
ent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assist-
ance in connection with which the action is taken . . . . Compliance with any
requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination
of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any
recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after oppor-
tunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termina-
tion or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or
other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made, and shall be limited in its
effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which noncompliance has been
so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, that no
such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised
the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and
has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means ....
20 U.S.C. § 1683 (1976) states:
Any department or agency action taken pursuant to section 1002 shall be subject
to such judicial review as may otherwise be provided by law for similar action taken
by such department or agency on other grounds. In the case of action, not other-
wise subject to judicial review, terminating or refusing to grant or to continue fi-
nancial assistance upon a finding of failure to comply with any requirement imposed
pursuant to section 1682, any person aggrieved (including any State or political
subdivision thereof and any agency of either) may obtain judicial review of such
action in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code, and such action
shall not be deemed committed to unreviewable agency discretion within the mean-
ing of section 701 of that title.
4. The concept of the federal court as champion of the private litigant who has been
excluded or forgotten by the legislature in the statutory scheme is deeply rooted in history. The
doctrine of an implied private right of action first surfaced in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241
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a private right of action as amounting to judicial legislation. . The better
approach recognizes that the implication of a private right of action by the
U.S. 33 (1916), in which the Court held that the plaintiff possessed a private right of action
under the Safety Appliance Acts, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§
1-16 (1970)). The plaintiff was permitted to sue and recover damages because the Safety
Appliance Act was drafted to protect the employee. 241 U.S. at 43.
The doctrine's genesis is found in common law tort theory, which gives a court the power to
imply a cause of action where a statute's intended beneficiary has been injured by an act prohib-
ited by the statute. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 286 (1934).
The implication of a private right of action in regulatory statutes is based on the principle that
the court has a right to effect full enforcement of the statute when necessary. See Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946), where the Court stated that "where federally protected rights have been
invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their re-
medies so as to grant the necessary relief." Id. at 684.
Private rights of action have been implied in the interpretation of the following statutes (a)
through (g): (a) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1976). These sections were enacted -after the Civil
War to protect civil rights, but they expressed no enforcement mechanism. The courts have
held that the private litigant can obtain legal and equitable relief in order to enforce §§ 1981
and 1982. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (implied private
right of action granted in suit alleging that membership in playground/park was restricted to
white persons); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (right to an equitable rem-
edy was implied when respondents allegedly refused to sell home to petitioner beause of his
race); (b) Safety Appliance Acts, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (current version at 45 U.S.C. 9§
1-16 (1970)). See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); (c) Railway Labor Act,
ch. 139, § 127, 63 Stat. 107 (1949) (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970)). See, e.g.,
companion cases of Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (railroad employee can
sue for injunctive relief and damages for failure of union to represent all employees regardless of
race); Turnstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944)
(duty imposed on union to represent all employees without regard to race); (d) Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970). See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544
(1968) (private right of action implied to insure the Voting Rights Act's guarantee that all per-
sons have the right to vote); (e) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
See, e.g., Piper v. Chris Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1976) (no private right of action granted
because of failure to meet the requisite criteria); Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975) (right of action implied only for the buyer or seller of securities); J.I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (stockholder permitted to bring private suit alleging false and
misleading proxy statements were given to effectuate a merger); (f) Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (see note 56 and accom-
panying text infra.); (g) Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976). See, e.g.,
N.A.A.C.P. v. Wilmington Medical Center, 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979) (see note 107 infra);
Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (private right of action implied
in class action on behalf of disabled persons in northeastern Illinois who could not use the
public transportation system); Whittaker v. Board of Higher Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y.
1978) (private right of action limited to plaintiffs vindication of personal rights and not extended
to include right to demand cut-off of federal funds). But cf. Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979) (Court did not decide if a private right of action exists under
Rehabilitation Act).
5. See Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARnv. L.
REV. 285, 291 (1963); Comment, Private Rights from Federal Statutes: Toward A Rational Use
of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 454 (1968). See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO &
H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHISLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 798-
800 (2d ed. 1973).
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court is the effectuation of the legislative purpose in the form of adjustment
of the relief to be granted under the statute.
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,6 the United States Supreme Court
held that Congress had implied a private right of action in Title IX. By
finding an implied private civil action, the Cannon Court supplemented the
sanction of fund termination and advanced Title IX toward its goal of ending
sex discrimination in federally funded educational institutions.'
This Note analyzes the structure and reasoning of the Cannon decision to
determine the legal propriety of the inference of a private right of action
under Title IX. The respective roles of the courts and Congress in the impli-
cation of a private right of action, as highlighted in Justice Powell's dissent-
ing opinion, are examined. Cannon's impact on other legislation, Title IX
claimants, educational institutions, and the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare (HEW) is analyzed. Finally, it is asserted that, in Cannon,
the Supreme Court properly recognized the individual litigant's right to be
heard in federal court and thus reinforced a meaningful national commitment
to eliminate sex-based discrimination in education.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
Petitioner, a thirty-nine-year-old surgical nurse, applied for admission to
medical school while completing her curn laude baccalaureate degree. 8 She
was denied admission to the 1975 entering classes of each respondent medi-
cal school, while students with lesser academic qualifications (as evaluated by
grade point average and test scores) were admitted. 9 Cannon alleged that
her rejection from medical school was the result of sex-based discrimination
in violation of Title IX.' 0 She claimed that the federally assisted, private
medical schools" l discriminated against women in their policies to reject
applicants over thirty years of age who do not hold an advanced degree. 12
The petitioner argued that because women are more likely than men to
postpone their professional education, the medical schools' age and advanced
degree poJicies exclude many women from professional school. 13
6. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
7. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
8. Brief for Petitioner at 3.
9. 441 U.S. at 680 n.2.
10. Id.
11. Petitioner's complaints named two private universities, the University of Chicago and
Northwestern University, as defendants. Officials of the medical schools associated with the
universities were also named. Both medical schools received some form of federal financial aid,
which obligated them under Title IX to cease discriminatory practices based on sex. See note 2
supra.
12. Age is a bar to admission for the applicant over thirty without an advanced degree.
Northwestern University Medical School disqualifies all applicants over thirty-five.
13. 441 U.S. at 680 n.2.
1979]
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In accordance with Title IX, petitioner filed complaints with HEW. 4
Although the statute was silent as to a private right of action, Cannon sued
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 15 ask-
ing the court to declare that the schools' age and advanced degree policies
violated Title IX. Cannon additionally requested that her medical school ap-
plication be reconsidered without regard to that policy. 16 Alternatively,
Cannon petitioned to compel the Secretary of HEW to respond favorably to
her administrative complaint. 17 The district court concluded that no private
right of action could be implied under Title IX and sua sponte dismissed that
portion of the complaint charging that HEW had failed to investigate
promptly and take timely administrative action.' The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 19
Subsequent to the court of appeals decision, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,20 which provides for payment of
attorneys' fees to a successful civil rights litigant. Title IX was specifically
designated as an applicable statute.2 1  In light of the Act, the court of ap-
peals granted a rehearing for consideration of its denial of a private right of
action under Title IX. 22 Nevertheless, the court of appeals concluded that
the 1976 Act did not create a private Title IX remedy. 23 The court
reasoned that Title IX was mentioned in the event that a private right of
action would be implied in the future. 2 4  On appeal, the Supreme Court
14. Id.
15. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
16. Brief for Petitioner at 3-4.
17. Brief for Petitioner at 4. Cannon contended that the delay and inactivity of HEW with
regard to her complaint amounted to unavailable administrative remedies. She wanted the court
to compel HEW to investigate her complaint promptly. Cannon joined the Secretary and Re-
gion V Director of the Office of Civil Rights of HEW as additional defendants in the complaint.
It is interesting to note that the federal respondents changed their position after prevailing in
the lower courts so as to support the petitioner's claim of an implied private right of action
under Title IX. See 441 U.S. 6S0 n.1, 687 n.8. The reason for the change in HEW's position is
unclear. Perhaps it can be explained by error in the briefs written for the lower courts or the
realization that a private right of action would be consistent with HEW's contention that it
cannot handle the increasing volume of Title IX complaints efficiently. See Brief for the Federal
Respondents at 6 n.9.
18. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. II. 1976). The district court
held that the administrative enforcement scheme authorized under Title IX had not been
exhausted by Cannon. The court further asserted that delay on the part of HEW did not justify
bypassing the administrative procedure set forth in the statute. Id. at 1260.
19. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976). The court characterized
the administrative enforcement scheme as "sophisticated" and saw "little to be gained by involv-
ing the judiciary in every act of discrimination based upon sex." Id. at 1074.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
21. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d at 1077. The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), specifically mentions civil actions under Title IX
for which attorneys' fees are allowed.
22. 559 F.2d at 1077.
23. Id. at 1079-80.
24. Id. at 1080.
1979] CANNON V. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 267
held that the petitioner could maintain her lawsuit without the express au-
thorization of a private right of action in the statutory scheme. 25
CASE ANALYSIS
Background of Title IX
Congress enacted Title IX in response to evidence of consistent and per-
vasive sex discrimination in education. 26 Supplementing the ban on dis-
crimination in education based on race, color, or national origin of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VT), 27 Title IX prohibits all sex-based
discrimination in educational programs and activities receiving federal finan-
cial assistance. .2
Section 1682 expressly provides a federal administrative enforcement
scheme that could result in the termination of federal funding for non-
compliance. 29 In most cases, the person subjected to sex discrimination
must channel the Title IX complaint through HEW. The specified adminis-
trative remedy is the termination of funds to the discriminatory institution.
Consequently, the complainant must await HEW's action on the complaint
25. 441 U.S. at 677, 717. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion, in which Justices Brennan,
Stewart, Marshall, and Rehnquist joined. Chief Justice Burger also concurred in the judgment.
Id. at 716. Justice Powell's dissent focused on the dangers of implication of a private right of
action generally. Id. at 730 . Justice White, with Justice Blackmun, dissented on the basis that
Congress had chosen an administrative remedy. Id. at 729.
26. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on § 805 of H.R. 16098 Before a Special
Subcomm. on Education of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 510
(1970). For a summary of the charges, allegations, and evidence of sex discrimination in educa-
tion presented at the hearings, see Murray, Economic and Educational Inequality Based on Sex:
An Overview, 5 VAL. U.L. REV. 237 (1971). See also 117 CONG. REc. H9822 (1971) (remarks of
Rep. Green); Note, Implied Rights of Action to Enforce Civil Rights: The Case for a Sympathetic
View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378 (1978). Title IX may be characterized as the logical extension, to
victims of sex discrimination, of the protection afforded racial discrimination victims by Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The legislative history is replete with evidence that Title IX was
patterned after Title VI. See 117 CONG. REC. S30407-8 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); 117
CONG. REC. H39256 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Green); 118 CONG. REC. S5803, 5807 (1972) (re-
marks of Sen. Bayh). The bill that evolved into Title IX was introduced as Title X of the Higher
Education Act of 1971, H.R. 7248, to amend Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1970 & F. Supp. V 1975).
28. See note 2 supra.
29. The enforcement scheme is authorized by 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1972). Section 1682 of Title
IX is identical to § 2000d of Title VI with the exceptions of the addition of the word "education"
in Title IX and Title IX's substitution of "sex" for "race, color, or national origin." See note 3
supra for relevant sections of Title IX.
Prior to fund termination, a typical Title IX complaint would progress as follows: the school is
informed of the Title IX violation; HEW determines if voluntary compliance is possible; there is
a finding of noncompliance after adequate opportunity for hearing and review; a full written
report of the decision to terminate funds is submitted to the appropriate House and Senate
subcommittees; no decision is effective until 30 days has expired from date of filing report. All
action under Title IX is subject to judicial review. See Shelton & Berndt, Sex Discrimination in
Vocational Education: Title IX and Other Remedies, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1141 (1974).
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for enforcement of Title IX, ° and she is generally relegated to the role of
amicus curiae in any proceedings resulting from HEW action. 31
Although Title IX was enacted in June, 1972, HEW did not issue
guidelines until June, 1975. 32 The belated regulations have generated con-
troversy, 3 and HEW's handling of complaints brought under Title IX has
been described as "grossly deficient" 34 and appears to be unenthusiastic.
35
30. Following an alleged violation of Title IX, the complainant would write to the regional
office of HEW to inquire regarding the educational institution's compliance with Title IX. HEW
should acknowledge the complaint and investigate the institution. If, after investigation, HEW
decides that no action is warranted, HEW must notify the complainant of that fact in writing.
See 45 C.F.R. § 87.71 (1978). If discrimination is found, the agency and the school would work
together to achieve compliance. See note 29 supra.
31. See 45 C.F.R. § 81.23 (1978), which states in relevant part: "A person submitting a
complaint . . . is not a party to the proceedings governed by this part, but may petition, after
proceedings are initiated, to become an amicus curiae." The administrative scheme also allows
HEW, in exceptional situations, to recommend that the Attorney General bring suit against the
offending institution to obtain an order to cease discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000h-2,
2000c-6(a)(2). 45 C.F.R. § 86.71 (1978), one of the Title IX regulations, refers back to the Title
VI procedures. For applicable Title VI procedure, see 45 C.F.R. § 80.8 (1978).
32. 45 C.F.R. part 86 (1978).
33. Perhaps the best indicia of the extent of the controversy over the proposed Title IX
regulations is found in the number of formal responses sent to HEW. During the 120 day
comment period following the issuance of the regulations, HEW received almost 10,000 written
formal comments. 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975).
An area of controvery surrounding the regulations is the exemption of private undergraduate
schools but the inclusion of "professional" schools within the scope of Title IX. HEW attempted
to clarify the confusion that resulted from some undergraduate schools that are also considered
"professional" schools. HEW maintained that admissions to all private undergraduate schools
are totally exempt. 40 Fed. Reg. 24130 (1975).
Another area of controversy stemmed from the insistence by some women's organizations that
HEW should take affirmative steps, through the Title IX regulations to censor sex stereotyping
in educational materials. HEW refused to take this action on constitutional first amendment
grounds. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24135 (1975); Hearing on Sex Discrimination and Sex Stereotyping in
Vocational Education Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Educa-
tion of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 183 (1975). A third
controversial area is Title IX's impact on employment discrimination. See Junior College Dist.
v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (HEW does not have the authority under Title
IX to regulate employment discrimination); Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 499 F. Supp. 866
(D. Me. 1978) (Title IX limited to prohibition of sex discrimination against students and not
teacher-employee); Romeo Community Schools v. United States Dept. of HEW, 438 F. Supp.
1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (HEW regulations concerning employment discrimination not within
Title IX's purpose). See generally Kroll, Title IX Sex Discrimination Regulations: Private Col-
leges and Acadenic Freedom, 13 URB. L. ANN. 107 (1977); Note, Title IX Sex Discrimination
Regulations: Impact on Private Education, 65 Ky. L.J. 656 (1977).
34. In Alexander v. Yale Univ., 458 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), the court acknowledged
that representations were made that the Title IX enforcement system was "grossly deficient in
actual operation." Id. at 6. The Alexander court held that a female student who received a low
grade because she rejected a male professor's sexual demands had the right to bring a private
action under Title IX. The court openly disagreed with the lower court Cannon decisions and
was "unable to agree that the private claim can be summarily dismissed without further inquiry
into actual need." Id. at 4.
35. The data received from HEW, telephone interview with Mr. Hal Bonnett, Management
and Administration, Office of Civil Rights (OCR), Washington, D.C. (Aug. 27, 1979), regarding
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Yet, absent an implied private right of action, the HEW administrative rem-
edy was the only vindication offered a Title IX complainant. Accordingly,
frustrated complainants turned to the federal courts for a forum. Although
some lower courts recognized an implied right of action under Title IX, 3 6
the course was often both unpredictable and inconsistent. 37
Title IX's enforcement, reflects a protracted period of time from date of filing to resolution of
the complaint. An average time period was 334 days from 1972-79. The approximate (inaccuracy
of the data was stressed by HEW) total number of Title IX complaints received nationally from
Jan. 1, 1972, through April 30, 1979, was 3,269. Of these complaints, 2,415 (74%) were consid-
ered to be resolved by April 30, 1979. Of these "resolved" complaints, 1,048 (43%) of the
complaints, were closed for administrative reasons. The administrative closure category includes
the following complaints: (1) those over which the OCR has no jurisdiction, (2) those that the
complainant withdrew, and (3) those in which the complainant did not provide enough informa-
tion for the investigation to proceed.
A second type of case, described in the HEW data and included in the number of cases
considered "resolved" by HEW, is the case dubbed "no change." This type of case reflects an
investigation by HEW resulting in the finding of no violation on the part of the institution; 652
cases (27%) of the resolved cases are in this category.
The third type of case included in the "resolved" category, as described by HEW, is the
"change" type of case. This characterization describes a situation where the complainant was
accomodated in some way. It includes those cases where an investigation took place, a violation
was found, and the institution corrected the violation. It also includes those cases where an
investigation revealed no violation but something was done by the institution to accommodate
the complainant; 715 (29.6%) of the resolved cases were in the "change" category. See Todd,
Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination in the Public
Schools, 53 TEX. L. REV, 103, 120 (1974), where it is suggested that vigorous enforcement of
the Title IX regulations is only a remote possibility because of HEW's realization that the fund
termination remedy cannot benefit the complainant or the institution. Id. at 120. See also
Comment, HEW's Title IX Regulations, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 133 (1976), where the regulations
are criticized for their inability to ensure the goals of Title IX-equal educational opportunities
for women and elimination of the sex stereotyping that results from limitations on educational
opportunities. See generally Project on Equal Education Rights, NOW (National Organization of
Women) Legal Defense and Education Fund, Stalled at the Start: Government Action on Sex
Bias in the Schools [hereinafter cited as P.E.E.R.]. The report is critical of HEW's handling of
the complaints.
36. See Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D. Conn. 1977) (private right of action
under Title IX recognized in student's action resulting from low grade given by professor whose
sexual demands were refused); Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779 (N.D.
Ohio 1976) (private right to sue recognized in Title IX action against museum). See also McCar-
thy v. Burkholder, 448 F. Supp. 41 (D. Kan. 1978) (implied private right of action under Title
IX would be based on Title IX's similarity to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but Title
IX provided administrative remedy and plaintiff failed to state claim upon which relief could be
granted).
37. Courts often avoided the issue of implication of a private right of action under Title IX
and found the private claim to be based on some other right. See, e.g., De La Cruz v. Tormey,
582 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1978), where the court held that the plaintiff-student was deprived of
equal educational opportunities because of the lack of child care facilities in the community
college district. The court added that the plaintiff was entitled to sue independently of the Title
IX claim because of the fulfillment of the requisite state action requirements of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
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Application of Cort v. Ash
Cannon was the first United States Supreme Court case to address di-
rectly the implication of a private right of action under Title IX. The Cannon
court determined that a private right of action exists under Title IX by con-
sidering four "relevant" factors it had outlined in Cort v. Ash: 38 (1) whether
plaintiff is "one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was
enacted"; 39 (2) whether an examination of the legislative history indicates a
legislative intent to create or deny a private right of action; 40 (3) whether an
implied right of action is consistent with the legislative purpose; 41 and (4)
whether the cause of action based on federal law should be relegated to the
states. 42
Benefit to a special class
The first factor suggested by Cort and considered by the Cannon Court
considers whether Title IX was enacted to benefit a certain class of which
plaintiff is a member. 43 The key to such a determination is the language of
See the cases that denied a private right of action under Title IX: Leffel v. Wisconsin In-
terscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (Title IX created only an ad-
ministrative remedy); Jones v. Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Ass'n, 453 F. Supp. 150
(W. D. Okla. 1977) (Title IX did not create a private right of action but if it had, the plaintiff
would have to exhaust administrative remedies first); Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Ath-
letic Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (Title IX could not be interpreted as a grant of
a private right of action before the exhaustion of administrative remedies in suit by female
student objecting to different male/female basketball rules). Compare the decisions that implied
a private right of action under Title IX: McCarthy v. Burkholder, 448 F. Supp. 41 (D. Kan.
1978) (court recognized that a private right of action would be based on Title IX's similarity to
Title VI but that this plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted); Alex-
ander v. Yale Univ. 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977) (female student granted right to bring
Title IX private right of action when her refusal of professor's sexual demands resulted in her
low grade); Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 425 F. Supp. 779 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (private
right of action under Title IX recognized but no discrimination established in action against
museum).
38. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort v. Ash, the Court decided not to imply a private right of
action for a stockholder under a criminal statute that restricted corporate contributions and
expenditures in connection with certain federal elections.
39. 422 U.S. at 78, quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
40. Id. at 78. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453, 458, 460 (1974).
41. 422 U.S. at 78. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. at 460 (1974); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423
(1975); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
42. 422 U.S. at 78. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 395
(1971) (state cannot limit the exercise of federal authority); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434
(1964) (state law may be relegated where overriding federal question is at issue); Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) (an action must be brought in state court unless there is
violation of federal law or basis for federal jurisdiction).
43. 441 U.S. at 689-93.
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the statute. Statutory language that focuses on a specific class is distinguish-
able from a statutory prohibition that is drafted to protect the general pub-
lic. 44 If Title IX had been drafted as a bare prohibition against discriminat-
ory activity by educational institutions receiving federal funds, implication of
private right of action might not have been consistent with the legislative
focus. 45 The language of the enacted statute confers a benefit on persons
who are subjected to sex discrimination in education. The limiting language
is found in the statement that "no person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, . . . be subjected to discrimination."'4 6 This language differs
from a rejected alternative draft that framed Title IX as a directive to the
Secretary of HEW "not [to] make any grant . . . [to any educational in-
stitution] unless . . . [the institution] will not discriminate on the basis of
sex. ... " 47 The rejected Title IX proposal was a bare instruction to HEW;
in contrast, the enacted statute is a protective measure for those who may be
subjected to sex-based discrimination in education. Language that focuses on
a specific group is essential to the first Cort factor. A court is justified in
implying a private right of action to a statutorily-circumscribed group in
order to effectuate the benefit the legislature intended to confer on members
of that group. 48
The Cannon Court concluded that the language of Title IX clearly articu-
lates the Act's purpose to benefit those persons who are subjected to sex
discrimination in education. 49 Therefore, Petitioner, who alleged that she
was denied admission to medical school because of her sex, was a member of
the special, protected class. 50
Legislative history of Title IX-patterned after Title VI
The second Cort factor that the Cannon Court utilized in its analysis of
Title IX required the Court to examine the legislative history of the stat-
ute.5 1 The Cannon Court noted that the legislative history of Title IX does
not reveal a congressional intent to deny a private right of action. 52 The
Court went further and found implicit indications, reflected in Title IX's
44. Id. at 690.
45. Id. at 691-93.
46. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
47. 117 CONG. REC. S30411 (1971) (Sen. McGovern's proposal).
48. 441 U.S. at 694.
49. Id. at 693-94.
50. Id. at 694.
51. Id.
52. 422 U.S. at 82. The Cort test is that the legislative history need not necessarily "show
an explicit purpose to create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such
cause of action would be controlling." Id. (emphasis in original).
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patterning after Title VI, 53 of a congressional assumption that a Title IX
private right of action exists. 54
The Court stressed that Title IX was deliberately patterned after and in-
tended to be interpreted similarly to Title V1. 5 5 Congress was aware that,
at the time of Title IX's enactment, a private right of action had already
been implied or assumed to exist under the companion statute, Title VI.56
The Cannon Court noted that -after the enactment of Title IX, the United
States Supreme Court had decided two cases brought by private litigants
under Title VI. Neither Lau v. Nichols57 nor Hills v. Gautreaux5 8 explicitly
addressed the question of the existence of a Title VI private right of action,
but the grant of relief to the individual petitioners further supports the exis-
tence of a private right of action under Title VI.
Thus, the Cannon Court reasoned that because Title VI had been inter-
preted so as to create a private right of action, Congress may have deter-
53. 441 U.S. at 694-96. Title IX is identical to Title VI in its description of the class to be
benefited, except for the substitution of Title VI language of "race, color, or national origin" foi
Title IX language of "sex" and the addition of the word "education". See notes 26 & 27 supra.
54. 441 U.S. at 694. See 117 CONG. REC. S30404, 30407 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); 117
CONG. REC. S30407 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
55. 441 U.S. at 696-98. See note 26 supra.
56. Id. at 696. See, e.g., Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (majority
assumed private right of action existed under Title VI); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976)
(note 58 and accompanying text infra); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (the first Title VI
private right of action case to reach the Supreme Court has been intepreted to imply a private
right of action (note 57 and accompanying text infra). An implied cause of action for Title VI
has found support in several lower federal court decisions. See Bossier Parish School Bd. v.
Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967) (case was before Congress when Title IX was enacted,
suggesting that Congress felt it was unnecessary to explicitly provide a private right to sue
under Title IX, when its model, Title VI, had already been interpreted as having a private right
of action).
Other federal courts have relied on Title VI as the right of action for a victim of discrimina-
tion. See Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1146
(W. D. Tex. 1972) (procedures of planning and construction of public housing project inadequate
to ensure goals of Title VI); Hawthorne v. Kenbridge Recreation Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 1382,
1383-84 (E.D. Va. 1972) (orgnaization ordered to accept members without regard to race);
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Inc. v. Connolly, 331 F. Supp. 940, 943-45 (E.D.
Mich. 1971) (private right of action granted under Title VI in suit alleging discrimination against
minority-owned businesses). Several cases dealing with Title VI questions assumed that a private
right of action existed under the statute. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (holding
that the Texas welfare system did not violate § 402(a)(23) of the Social Security Act, the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment or Title VI); Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503
F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that Title VI was violated by Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) in action by Blacks who were displaced by public housing project); Ottero v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973) (private right of action implied in suit
challenging tenant selection process for federal housing unit).
57. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). In Lau, the Court granted private relief to aggrieved students who
sued under Title VI, holding that non-English speaking students of Chinese ancestry were de-
nied a meaningful opportunity to participate in public educational programs.
58. 425 U.S. 284 (1976). The Court found that a complaint charging racial discrimination in
choosing a site for a housing project amounted to a Title VI cause of action.
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mined that a provision for private right of action under Title IX, its progeny,
was unnecessary. In sum, the second Cort factor supported a Title IX pri-
vate right of action because the legislative history revealed a congressional
inference of such a right.
The purpose of the statute
The Cannon Court evaluated the third Cort factor, which demands an
examination of the purpose of the legislative scheme. 59 The directive is
clear: the courts must provide an effective remedy to achieve Congress' pur-
pose. 60 The Cannon Court interpreted Cort as holding that a private right
of action should not be implied if it conflicts with the purpose of the statute.
Conversely, if a private right of action is harmonious with the underlying
purpose of the statute, its implication is favored. 61
The Cannon Court articulated the purpose of Title IX as two-fold: to end
sex discrimination in education 6 2 and to divert federal funds from dis-
criminatory programs. 63 At the same time, the Court noted the possible
inappropriateness of Title IX's fund termination procedure. 64 Specifically,
Ms. Cannon sought an order requiring her acceptance into the professional
program to remedy the medical school's alleged violation of Title IX. Her
objective would be poorly served by a cut-off of funds to the institutions. 65
The third Cort factor is therefore satisfied because in this and comparable
situations, individual relief is more consistent with fulfilling the statute's
purpose than other available remedies. 66
59. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
60. Id. at 84, quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964): "[I]t is the duty of
the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congres-
sional purpose." Id.
61. 441 U.S. at 703.
62. See 118 CONG. REc. S5806-07 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) ("Title IX is a strong and
comprehensive measure which I believe is needed if we are to provide women with solid legal
protection as they seek education and training for later careers.") See also 117 CONG. REc.
S30403 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh) ("While over 50 percent of our population is female, there
is no effective protection for them as they seek admission to and employment in educational
facilities. The antidiscrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 do not deal with sex
discrimination by our institutions of higher learning.")
63. See 117 CONG. REC. H39252 (1972) where Congressman Mink said that educational
institutions which discriminate against women "should not be asking the taxpayers of this coun-
try to pay for this kind of discrimination." Id.
64. 441 U.S. at 705.
65. Id. at 705-06.
66. This type of situation is exemplified by Cannon's position. A private right of action is





A fourth and final consideration suggested by Cort raises a question about
the propriety of a federal remedy if the subject matter is traditionally of state
concern. 67 It would be inappropriate to imply a federal cause of action
where state remedies and interests are involved. The Cannon Court briefly
considered this factor and recognized that since the Civil War, primarily the
federal courts have been concerned with discrimination. 68 Further, Title IX
prohibits discrimination in federally funded educational institutions, and, as the
Cannon Court noted, expenditure of federal funds also concerns the federal
courts. 69 No traditional state concerns are involved in examination of Title
IX, so the fourth Cort factor supports implication of a private right of action
under the statutory scheme that prohibits sex-based discrimination. Accord-
ingly, the Cannon Court concluded that application of all four Cort factors
consistently supports a private right of action under Title IX. 70
The Validity of the Cort v. Ash Factors
The decision in Cort v. Ash attempted to articulate comprehensive stan-
dards for inferring a civil cause of action from a statute. Justice Powell's
dissent questioned the validity of the Cort v. Ash criteria 7' and clearly
stated his reluctance to imply a private right of action in all but the most
compelling situations. 72 The dissent charged that the majority's analysis en-
courages Congress to avoid controversial issues and courts to assume legisla-
tive powers. 73 Justice Powell urged that Cort be overruled or at least criti-
cally re-examined, stating that Cort fosters an unconstitutional violation of
the separation of powers principle of limited jurisdiction. 74
On the contrary, application of the Cort factors does not violate constitu-
tional principles. The separation of powers principle can be logically under-
stood as fostering a division of labor according to expertise. 7 While article
III of the constitution concededly grants Congress the power to determine
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, 76 and as a corollary, empowers
Congress to determine the scope and extent of statutory remedies, when the
Congress fails to specify the availability of a private right of action, the role
67. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
68. 441 U.S. at 708-09.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 709.
71. Id. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 749.
73. Id. at 742-44.
74. Id. at 730-31.
75. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1, states that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States shall
be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish."
76. See D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 18 (1977).
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of the judiciary becomes crucial.77 The judicial role is traditionally distinct
from the legislative role; the judiciary should enforce but not enact. To en-
force Title IX, the Cannon Court determined that a private right of action
was necessary and consistent with the intent of Congress. 78 This determi-
nation is best characterized as the Court's acceptance of a congressional del-
egation of power to effectuate the legislature's intent.79
The Cannon Court recognized that the four Cort factors are guidelines and
not definitive requirements for implication of a private right of action. 80
The focus of Justice Powell's dissent is not on the majority's use of the Cort
factors as guidelines but rather, whether Cort should continue to serve as a
framework for the implication of a private right of action. si
Examining the development of the four factors set out in Cort, it becomes
obvious that the Cori decision did not establish a new test. On the contrary,
the clear trend in the years before the Cort decision was toward implication
of a private right of action. 82 The Cort decision represents a culmination of
years of judicial logic and analysis 83 that came to favor a private right of
action under certain defined circumstances. 84 The demand of the Cort
analysis to consider all "relevant" criteria has contributed to judicial caution
regarding the implication doctrine. More recent decisions have tended to be
more restrictive regarding implication of private actions not expressed in the
legislative scheme. 85 In this sense, the Cort factors restrain a court's ten-
77. There is a historical and continuing controversy over the role of the judiciary in imply-
ing a private right of action under a statute. One side of the controversy, in agreement with
Justice Powell's dissent, characterizes implication of any remedy not expressly authorized by
Congress as unwarranted. See generally W. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS (1975); Frank-
furter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 534 (1947).
On the other hand, it has been strenuously urged that courts have authority to imply a
private right of action. See generally Seng, Private Rights of Action, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 1117
(1978); Karst, Federal Remedies, 54 J. URa. L. 1025 (1977); Note, Implying Civil Remedies
from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REv. 285 (1963).
78. 441 U.S. at 717.
79. See notes 98-103 and accompanying text supra.
80. 441 U.S. at 688-89.
81. Id. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting).
82. In the decade prior to Cort, the Court found implied rights of action in all of the cases
it heard on this question. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1968); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544 (1968); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Wyandotte Transp. Co v.
United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (private right of action involving abandoned vessel in viola-
tion of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1151-54, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401,
403-4, 406-9, 411-16, 418 (1899) (current version at 33 U.SC. §§ 401, 403-4, 406, 408-9, 411-15
(1976)); J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
83. See notes 38-42 and accompanying text supra.
84. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1974).
85. In the same term that Cannon was decided, the Supreme Court was called upon to
consider the existence of a private right of action under other statutes. See Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (private right of action denied under Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 552-553 (1976) because it is exclusively a disclosure statute and does not mandate suit
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dency to imply a private right of action in inappropriate situations. After
each Cort factor is carefully analyzed, it is clear that they help to check
undisciplined judicial implication of civil actions. The first factor bars
everyone from the federal courts except the direct beneficiaries of the stat-
ute. The second factor demands that courts refuse to infer a right of action if
Congress expressly intended to deny that right. The third factor demands
that the private right of action be consistent with the legislative scheme.
Finally, unless the right in question is of federal concern, the fourth factor
will ensure that the claim is relegated to the states.
Abandonment of the logical structure of Cort could foster disorganized
approaches in subsequent litigation, inconsistent decisions, and excessive use
of the implication doctrine. For these reasons, the Cort factors should con-
tinue to provide a framework for judicial implication of a private right of
action.
The Shortcomings of Respondents' Arguments
The majority also considered three of the respondent-universities' conten-
tions. First, the Cannon Court addressed the universities' principal fear that
their admission decisions would now be subject to judicial interference . 6
The universities argued that disappointed applicants, with access to the fed-
eral courts, could threaten the university's freedom to choose its own stu-
dent body. 87 As a result, the universities asserted that the courts will be in
effect selecting the school's student body. 88 The Court answered that Con-
gress had already addressed the schools' fears and had resolved the argument
as speculative. 89 Referring to the case-history of Title VI after a private
for nondisclosure. Cort v. Ash was cited as authority for denying private right of action under
criminal statute, Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976)); Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979) (the claimant under the Rehabilitation Act was denied relief
although the express issue of a private right of action under the Rehabilitation Act was not
decided) (see notes 113-114 and accompanying text infra); Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 99
S. Ct. 2479 (1979) (failure of broker-dealers to keep reports of financial conditions and to file
with SEC as required by § 17(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 q(a) (1976)
does not create a private right of action in favor of anyone); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979) (private right of action implied under § 215 of Investment
Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 6 80b(1) (1976) for relief associated with contract rescission,
injunctive relief, and restitution, but § 206 of the Act is a proscriptive section not conferring a
private right of action). These decisions illustrate the Court's movement away from the tendency
to imply private rights of action toward a careful consideration of all "relevant" criteria sur-
rounding the statute. As a result, private rights of action have been implied by the Court more
infrequently.
86. 441 U.S. at 709.
87. Brief for Respondents at 13.
88. Id. at 15.
89. 441 U.S. at 709. See 117 CONG. REc. H39254 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Wyman) (urging
rejection of Title IX proposal because it "unreasonably invades the policy prerogatives of these
institutions").
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right of action had been applied under that statute, the Court noted that the
fears of the schools had not materialized; there had been no undue judicial
interference in academic decisions under Title VI. 90 The schools, therefore,
had no reason to fear such interference under Title IX. In any event, this is
not a legal but, rather, a policy argument which, in the Court's opinion,
Congress had previously resolved. 91
The Court briefly acknowledged two additional contentions, both based on
the premise that Title IX should be interpreted similarly to Title VI. The
respondents first asserted that because Congress created express private
remedies in other titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and not in Title VI, 92
implication of a private right of action under Title VI is unwarranted. There-
fore, the respondents reasoned by extension that a Title IX right of action
should not be implied. The second assertion, closely related to the first, was
that certain passages found in Title VI's legislative history 93 foreclose a pri-
vate right of action under Title VI and analogously under Title IX. The Can-
non Court responded that Congress' understanding of Title VI at the time
Title IX was enacted was controlling. 94 At that time, Congress understood
Title VI to be enforceable by a private right of action. 95 In any event, the
Court denied that the mere existence of an express administrative remedy is
a sufficient reason to refuse to imply an alternative and more appropriate
remedy. 96
IMPACT
The Appropriate Judicial Role
The creation of a private right of action under Title IX alters the legal
options of a person aggrieved by a violation of the statute. 97 Under Can-
non, a private litigant may now enforce Title IX in the federal courts; how-
ever, Cannon is also an example of expanding judicial responsibility in the
interpretation of statutes. The immediate origins of the judiciary's shift from
emphasis on traditional development of case law to a more activist role may
be found in the court's activity in the school desegregation cases9 or in the
90. 441 U.S. at 709-10. For commentary on the effect of Title VI enforcement on the educa-
tional institutions, see Slippen, Administrative Enforcement of Civil Rights in Public Education:
Title VI, HEW, and the Civil Rights Reviewing Authority, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 931, 941-42
(1975).
91. 441 U.S. at 710 n.44.
92. Id. at 710. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1976) (Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), (3) (1970) (Title VII).
93. 441 U.S. at 710. See CONG. REC. H1519 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); 110 CONG.
REc. H2467 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); 110 CONG. REC. S6562 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Kuchel); 110 CoNG. REc. S7063 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Pastore); 110 CONG. REC. S7065 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Keating); 110 CONG. REC. S8345 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
94. 441 U.S. at 711.
95. Id. at 710-16. See note 56 supra.
96. Id. at 711.
97. See note 115 and accompanying text infra.
98. D. HoRowlTz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 10 (1977).
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loosening of jurisdictional and standing requirements that render judicial
remedies a more readily available option. 99 Regardless of the impetus for
this shift in emphasis, the judiciary's activity is based on its attempt to re-
solve a problem unsatisfactorily or incompletely addressed by another branch
of government. 100
A court may be accused of judicial law-making 10 1 when it implies a private
right of action from a statute. But the theory of implying a right of action
from a legislative scheme is founded on the court's recognition of its duty to
effectuate the purposes of the statute. 102 Congress enacts legislation to ac-
complish particular goals and the courts apply the statute on a case-by-case
basis in order to effectuate the legislative purpose. In most situations, Con-
gress creates express and exclusive remedies, and judicial analysis of con-
gressional purpose becomes unnecessary. When the express remedy is not
also an exclusive remedy, however, the court may find a civil remedy im-
plied in the legislative scheme. In this instance, Congress has effectively
delegated to the federal courts the ability to effectuate congressional purpose
by providing the appropriate relief. Through their posture of "remedial
creativity," 103 the courts accept this congressionally delegated responsibility.
In the instant case, Justice Powell argued that provision of a private right
of action is a legislative function, and the courts should not assume that role
except in the face of very persuasive evidence of affirmative congressional
intent. 104 Even under this narrow view of the judicial role, the Cannon
Court's implication of a private right of action under Title IX was appro-
priate. The analysis of congressional intent employed by the Cannon Court
was inductive: (a) the legislative history reveals that Congress patterned Title
IX after Title VI; (b) Title VI had been interpreted as providing an implied
private right of action; (c) Congress was probably aware of this interpreta-
tion; thus (d) Congress intended Title IX to be similarly interpreted.
A statute incapable of furthering its legislative purpose may need to be
fortified through its interpretation. A court may find that implication of a
private right of action is required to achieve the legislative goals. 105 Title
IX is such a statute. The express remedy of fund termination did not effec-
99. Id.
100. Id. at 6.
101. 441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting).
102. Klotz, Emerging Standards for Implied Actions Under Federal Statutes, 9 U.L.J. REF.
294, 296 (1976).
103. Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts, 117
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33 (1968). See also Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a
Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1549 (1972).
104. 441 U.S. at 742-43.
105. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). Tenants complained
of the landlord's discrimination against nonwhites and the tenants' loss of the enjoyment of an
integrated community. Although the tenants were not held to be "persons aggrieved" under the
[Vol. 29:263
1979] CANNON V. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
tively discourage sex discrimination in educational institutions. 106 As a re-
sult of Cannon, the private claimaint has ar implied right of action under
Title IX. Now the individual may petition for the remedy that is directly
responsive to the act of discrimination; the person who complains of dis-
crimination in admission policies may attain the specific goal of admission to
the educational institution. To maintain that the termination of federal funds
is the exclusive remedy is to offer an incongruous response to this act of
discrimination and effectively frustrate congressional purpose.
Effect on Other Statutes
The implication of a private right of action under Title IX may serve to
clarify the existence of a private right of action under filial statutes. 107 Al-
though the Cannon opinion relied heavily on judicial and legislative in-
terpretations of Title VI10 8 as a model for Title IX, the Court has never
explicitly declared that a private right of action exists under Title VI. 109
The implication of a private right of action in Title IX reinforces the in-
terpretation that a private right of action exists under Title VI.
The Rehabilitation Act 10 was not mentioned by the Cannon Court be-
cause it was enacted after Title IX and was, therefore, irrelevant to the Title
IX framers' intentions to create a private right of action. The Rehabilitation
Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 810(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a), 82 Stat. 85 (1968), the Court discussed
the need to fortify the statute by private litigation and noted the scarcity of attorneys, lack of
enforcement power of HUD, and the "enormity of the task of an enforcement by the adminis-
trative agency." 409 U.S. at 211.
106. See note 35 supra.
107. These filial statutes are Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1973). The mutually dependent relationship of the Rehabilitation Act, Title VI, and Title IX is
demonstrated in NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979) which
cited Cannon. The NAACP court demonstrated that an implied right of action was available
under Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act for complaints arising out of a proposed relocation of a
health care facility.
108. 441 U.S. 694-98.
109. See notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra.
110. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Rehabilitation Act] prohibits discrimination in federally assisted programs on the basis of a
potential participant's handicap. The legislative history reveals that § 504 was patterned after
Title VI and Title IX, both of which were considered to "permit a judicial remedy through a
private action." S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6390-91.
The United States Supreme Court did not explicitly decide whether an implied right of action
exists under the Rehabilitation Act in the recent case, Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979). See notes 113-14 and accompanying text infra.
In Lloyd v. Regional.Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977), the Seventh Circuit held
that the affirmative rights established by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act could be vindicated by
an implied right of action at a time when no administrative remedy was operative. Lloyd lan-
guage was limited by Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1979) which read Lloyd to
grant a private right of action under the Rehabilitation Act if the "proper" defendants are in-
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Act was, however, mentioned in the Cannon briefs "' as support for a Title
IX private right of action because the Rehabilitation Act was patterned after
both Title VI and Title IX. It is significant, therefore, that federal courts
have interpreted the Rehabilitation Act as guaranteeing a private right of
action to its protected class. 112 Subsequent to Cannon, the Supreme Court,
in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 113 denied relief to the indi-
vidual claimant and found it unnecessary to address explicitly the question of
the existence of a private right of action under § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. 114 Although Cannon lends support to the implication of a private right
of action under Title VI and under the Rehabilitation Act, the Court has
never definitively implied private rights of action under these analogous stat-
utes.
The Cannon Court not only implied a private right of action under Title IX
but it also guaranteed a right of action for the individual Title IX claimant, as
volved. Private right of action was refused because the federal agency defendant was not a
"program or activity receiving federal financial assistance" under the Rehabilitation Act. Fur-
thermore, a private right of action has been implied in cases heard after the § 504 regulations (45
C.F.R. § § 84.1-84.47 (1978)) were in effect. The basis of the decisions are that individual rights
described under the Rehabilitation Act are not condemned to an inefficient and inadequate
complaint procedure. See Whittaker v. Board of Higher Educ., 461 F. Supp. 99 (E.D.N.Y.
1978) (alcoholic teacher who had been denied tenure contended that alcoholism was a handicap
protected under Rehabilitation Act); Campbell v. Kruse, 434 U.S. 808 (1977) (suit remanded to
district court to decide private Rehabilitation Act claim); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d
Cir. 1977) (private right of action granted for severely handicapped persons who complained
that the mass transportation system was inaccessible and in violation of federal regulations).
Every circuit court that considered the existence of a private right of action under the Re-
habilitation Act decided that a private action should be implied. See, e.g., Davis v. Southeast-
ern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2361
(1979) (hearing-impaired licensed practical nurse able to pursue a private right of action for
admission into nursing program); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977); United Hand-
icapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (plaintiffs granted relief for defendant's
failure to make federally funded urban mass transit system accessible to mobility disabled per-
sons); Kammeire v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977) (one-eyed student granted private
right of action but denied relief for exclusion from contact sports).
Other cases have recognized a private right of action under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Doe v. Colautti, 454 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979) (court
recognized existence of private right of action for a patient at private psychiatric hospital but
noted the failure of plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Vanko v. Finley, 440 F. Supp.
656 (N. D. Ohio 1977) (court recognized private right of action in suit alleging defendant's failure
to provide access to mass transportation systems for the mobility disabled); Drennon v.
Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (probable cause of action was noted
but the court invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in delaying suit until United States
Department of Labor considered plaintiffs claims); Crawford v. University of N.C., 440 F. Supp.
1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (on the condition that plaintiff initiate complaint with HEW, preliminary
injunction granted to deaf graduate student who alleged that university policy of denying in-
terpreter services violated the Rehabilitation Act).
111. Petitioner's Brief at 6-7; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3; Federal Respondents' Brief at
12, 13, 19, 35, 36, 38, 39, 42, 43.
112. See note 110 supra.
113. 99 S. Ct. at 2361 (1979).
114. Id. at 2366 n.5.
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distinguished from a large group of claimants. Inferring a private civil action
in a class action is generally considered to be a less severe judicial action
than implying a private right of action for an individual claimant. 115 Can-
non was initiated by a single litigant. It is clear, therefore, that a Title IX
private action is not limited to a class action suit. In contrast, earlier deci-
sions construing Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act had been interpreted as
allowing a private right of action only when a large number of complainants
are involved, as in a class action suit. 11 6  Cannon renders a distinction be-
tween a large group of plaintiffs and the individual plaintiff unimportant
under these filial statutes as well.
Although the Cannon decision interpreting Title IX suggests that a similar
approach would be adopted in interpreting Title VI and the Rehabilitation
Act, the Cannon decision directly applies only to Title IX. The Supreme
Court's post-Cannon refusal to consider the existence of a Rehabilitation Act
private right of action, in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 117 in-
dicates the continued uncertainty of private rights of action under statutes
analogous to Title IX.
Social and Educational Impact
The implication of a private right of action in Cannon is socially significant
because the Court has granted the individual litigant an alternative to the
apparently ineffective administrative enforcement scheme. 118 The right of
the individual complainant directly to approach the federal courts with
charges of sex discrimination in educational institutions is a significant social
gain.
Educational institutions are powerful forces in developing skills and at-
titudes necessary to succeed in professions and employment. 119 Sex-based
115. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 558 F.2d 1063, 1074 n.16 (7th Cir. 1976), where
the court said, "We note, but do not decide, that a suit brought by a large group to enforce the
national interest against sexual discrimination may be possible under Title IX. Certaintly, it was
permitted by the Supreme Court under Title VI in Lau v. Nichols." Id.
116. See Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1974). See, e.g.,
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (discussed at note 57 supra); Lloyd v. Regional Transp.
Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (discussed at note 110 supra); Bossier Parish School Bd. v.
Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967) (discussed at note 56 supra).
117. 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979).
118. See generally Note, Sex Discrimination -The Enforcement Provisions for Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 Can Be Strengthened to Make the Title IX Regulations More
Effective, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 207 (1975). This commentator discusses the regulations and the delay
that is the primary weakness of the enforcement scheme. See note 35 supra.
119. See L. LONGSTRETH, PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHILD 499 (2d ed.
1974).
The Supreme Court noted the value of education at all levels in Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347, U.S. 483, 493 (1954), where it stated that "[education] ... is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment." Id. at 493.
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admission restrictions to professional or technical schools inhibit human po-
tential and prevent women from achieving education and economic equality.
The present inequality can be illustrated by comparing the wages of men
and women within various occupations. 120 These statistics demonstrate that
men and women are most economically equal in the professional and techni-
cal fields. Because these fields offer women economic equality with men,
it is critical that women be evaluated for admission to professional and tech-
nical schools on nonsex-based criteria.
Medical school admission committees have been particularly criticized for
prejudice against women applicants. 121 For example, testimony before a
special congressional subcommittee charged that medical school admission
committees are biased against women. 122 Prior to the implication of a Title
IX private right of action, these charges of discrimination could only be filed
with HEW and an investigation may have resulted. 123 Professional schools
were unable in the past to confront the Title IX complainants. At the same
time, the sex discrimination complainants were confined to an administrative
enforcement scheme that was unresponsive to the individual complain-
ant. 124 Consequently, without a Title IX private right of action, educational
institutions were unable to respond effectively to discrimination charges, and
120. See Women Employed, Closing the Wage Gap: A National Imperative (1979). The
"wage gap" is most narrowed in professional and technical fields where women's average salary
is 71% of those of the men's in those fields. See also U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR-STATUS OF
AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS BY SEX, 1978:
Women's Salary
1978 Average as Percentage
Occupation Weekly Earnings of Men's
Men Women
Sales Workers $283 $129 45%
Blue Collar Workers 253 146 58
Managers/Administrators 361 212 59
Clerical Workers 255 165 65
Service Workers (except
private household) 189 126 67
Professional & Technical
Workers 344 246 71
121. See M. WALSH, DOCTORS WANTED: No WOMEN NEED APPLY (1977). See also R.
O'NEIL, DISCRIMINATING AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 151-2 (1975).
, 122. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on § 805 of H.R. 16098 Before a Special
Subcomm. on Education of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 510
(1970). Francis S. Norris, M.D. testified that although women applicants to medical school have
increased in the past 36 years, the proportion of women accepted into medical school has fallen.
She attributed this trend to discriminating medical school admission policies. Id. at 510.
123. See note 29 supra.
124. Id.
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the individuals complaining of sex discrimination were not granted the de-
sired relief of admission to the institution.
Some commentators have argued that the implication of a private right of
action will possibly inhibit the academic freedom of educational institu-
tions. 125 Private education is especially fearful of government man-
dates. 126 In Cannon, Justice Powell warned that the implication of a pri-
vate right of action under Title IX would disturb the autonomy of the
academic community and result in inevitable harm to society. 127
It is possible, however, that the vitality of Title IX, fortified by the vigor
of private enforcement, will free complying educational institutions from the
suspicion of discrimination. In any event, those educational institutions with
discriminatory policies should not be permitted to cloak them in their con-
cern over entrenchment of academic freedom. Admittedly, the Cannon deci-
sion will at times subject nondiscriminatory institutions to vexatious and
expensive suits. On the other hand, it has been contended recently that
complex regulations and workable enforcement procedures are equally, if
not more, vexatious and expensive. z1 2  The Court had two choices regarding
Title IX's future: either imply a private right of action or demand enforce-
ment of the Title IX regulations with unprecedented vigor and commit-
ment. Either alternative would mean the expense of adjustment and com-
pliance for the offending institutions. Regardless of the arena, complainants
deserve protection from arbitrary exclusion and discrimination.
Impact on HEW
Congress delegated the responsibility for enforcing Title IX to HEW. 129
The Cannon Court's implication of a Title IX private right of action will re-
125. See Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 447 (1963) (1940 Statement of Principles).
126. See Kroll, Title IX Sex Discrimination Regulations: Private Colleges and Academic Free-
dom, 13 URB. L. ANN. 107 (1977); Note, Title IX Sex Discrimination Regulations: Impact on
Private Education, 65 Ky. L.J. 656 (1977). It is possible that private universities can selectively
accept federal financial assistance in lieu of total compliance with Title IX. The Title IX prohibi-
tions are aimed at specific programs within an institution that fails to comply. See note 3 supra
for text of § 1682.
127. 441 U.S. at 747-48 (Powell, J., dissenting).
128. See Complaint, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Attorney General of the United States, No.
79-244 (filed January 24, 1979 D.D.C.). The complaint alleged that conflicting compliance re-
quirements resulted in difficulty with enforcement and confusion that caused discrimination
against all employees. Id. at 19. Sears sought a court order that, inter alia, would require the
defendants to issue clear, uniform guidelines instructing employers how to resolve conflicts in
the regulations. Id. at 30-31. The district court held, 19 E.P.D. 9164A, 19 F.E.P. Cas. 916
(D.D.C. 1979), that the suit failed to present a case or controversy under art. III of the Con-
stitution and that the plaintiff failed to establish a causal connection between government
policies and difficulties outlined in the complaint.
129. 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1976).
1979]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:263
lieve HEW of the entire burden of enforcement. The delays involved in
HEW's handling of Title IX complaints, coupled with the incongruence of a
fund termination remedy for an individual seeking admission to medical
school, prompted Ms. Cannon to bring suit. 130 Because HEW's perform-
ance with regard to Title IX complaints was an important element pre-
cipitating the Cannon decision, it is necessary to examine HEW's traditional
treatment of Title IX complaints in order to analyze the impact that the
Cannon decision will have on HEW.
Title IX's prohibition of sex discrimination in education is enforced by
HEW. Sex discrimination, although objectionable, is often considered less
serious than racial discrimination. 131 This priority may have hindered vig-
orous Title IX enforcement by the agency which is also responsible for en-
forcement of Title VI's protections against race discrimination.
Almost two decades ago, integration of southern schools was accomplished
largely through HEW's enthusiasm and commitment to Title VI enforce-
ment. 132 In contrast, since its enactment, Title IX's administrative en-
forcement proceedings have been plagued by delay and inefficiency. 1 33
Finalized Title IX regulations were not issued until three years after the
effective date of Title IX. 134 The regulations have been criticized for their
inherent unresponsiveness to individual complaints, 135 for compliance re-
130. 441 U.S. at 681 n.2.
131. Some commentators are in agreement. See Buek and Orleans, Sex Discrimination-A
Bar to a Democratic Education: Overview of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 6
CONN. L. REV. 1 (1973), where it was stated: "Legislatures and courts at all levels, reflecting
views held in many parts of American society, perceive sex discrimination as less onerous or less
invidious than discrimination based on race, color, or national origin." Id. at 2. See Johnston &
Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 675
(1971), where the author examines a variety of cases and demonstrates discrimination against
women in judicial reasoning.
Judicial opinions also reveal this attitude that racial discrimination is more odious than sex
discrimination. In Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 438 U.S. 265 (1978), for example, the
Court said: "[T]he perception of racial classifications as inherently odious stems from a lengthy
and tragic history that gender-based classifications do not share. In sum, the Court has never
viewed such classification as inherently suspect or as comparable to racial or ethnic classifica-
tions for the purpose of equal-protection analysis." Id. at 303. See Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459
F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Conn. 1977) (the court noted that the discrepancy between enforcement
rights of a Title IX victim of sex discrimination and a Title VI victim of race discrimination make
it difficult to follow the lower court Cannon decisions which had denied a private right of
action). It would seem, however, that the inequality between the sexes predates any prejudice
based on race or nationality and is all the more tragic because it cuts across all race groups and
minimizes the potential of half of the population.
132. Between 1966 and 1968, HEW cut off funds to schools in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia. See United States Comm'n on Civil Rights,
3 The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort-1974, 128 (1975).
133. See note 35 supra.
134. Regulations were effective 7-21-75. See 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1978).
135. See Case Developments-An Analysis of H.E.W. Regulations Concerning Sex Discrimina-
tion in Education, 3 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 69, 70, n.45 (1976) [hereinafter Case Develop-
ments]. The article discusses the ambiguities and weaknesses of HEW's Title IX regulations.
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views that rely heavily on the educational institutions' initiative and voluntar-
iness, 136 and for the slow pace with which complaints are resolved. 137
These delayed guidelines were the sole guidance given to educational in-
stitutions regarding their responsibilities under Title IX. Prior to Cannon,
Title IX enforcement depended on these belated regulations which have not
been effectively enforced. 138
While HEW has recognized the inadequacy of its enforcement of Title
IX, 19 it initially opposed implication of a private right of action as Cannon
rose through lower courts. 140 When Cannon reached the Supreme Court,
however, HEW took the position that a private right of action should be
implied. 141 The best explanation for HEW's changed position is inter-
departmental confusion. 142 It is this same confusion which has crippled the
effective enforcement of Title IX. HEW should support a private right of
action because that right palliates HEW's own inadequacy. To deny that a
private right of action under Title IX is needed, HEW must be able to
assure that complaints could be handled effectively within the administrative
enforcement scheme. Past performance and increasing complaint volume 143
make this assurance improbable.
The Cannon decision is consistent with HEW's current postion that Title
IX enforcement procedures must be supplemented to effectuate Title IX.
Private litigation may act as a pressure valve to relieve HEW's ineffective
activity with regard to Title IX complaints. 144
The enforcement procedure is severely criticized as unresponsive to individual complaints. See
note 33 supra for discussion of the areas of controversy surrounding Title IX regulations.
136. See Case Developments, supra note 135, at 70. See also 45 C.F.R. § 86.3 (1978).
137. See Note, Sex Discrimination-The Enforcement Provisions for Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972 Can Be Strengthened to Make the Title IX Regulations More Effec-
tive, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 207, 219 (1975).
138. See note 35 supra (HEW statistics).
139. See, e.g., Adams v. Mathews, 536 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam), where the
Women's Equity Action League was allowed to intervene as a matter of right. Suit was brought
to compel HEW to take action to end racial discrimination in employment and schools in cer-
tain southern communities. HEW said that the court order to take more prompt action to end
racial discrimination under Title VI would make it impossible to devote any HEW resources to
Title IX enforcement.
140. See the lower court Cannon decisions: 406 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (N.D. 11. 1976) and 559
F.2d 1063, 1080 (7th Cir. 1976).
141. 441 U.S. 687-88 n.8. See generally Federal Respondents' Brief.
142. See Federal Respondents' Brief at 6 n.9, where HEW noted that "the failure of the
federal respondents to endorse this position earlier in this litigation is attributable to communi-
cation lapses between national and regional HEW offices, not to any eleventh hour policy shift."
Id.
143. See P.E.E.R., note 35 supra, at A-17. In 1973, 46 complaints were filed while in 1976,
262 complaints were filed with HEW, OCR, Elementary and Secondary Education Division.
See also Federal Respondents' Brief at 49-50, where it is stated that Title IX applies to
federally funded education programs at approximately 97,000 institutions and affects 55 million
participants in these programs. See also Amicus Brief at 9, Ludwig v. Board of Educ., 601 F.2d
589 (6th Cir. 1979) (where a 37% increase in complaints during 1977 over the same period in
1976 was noted).
144. See note 35 supra for statistics regarding number of complaints investigated by HEW.
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The recent formation of the Department of Education 145 was based on just
this "need for improvement in the management and coordination of Federal
education programs." 146 This newly formed department will probably as-
sume the responsiblity for Title IX enforcement. The inevitable temporary
confusion and delay that will result from the transfer of departments may
have some effect on Title IX administrative enforcement, but the effect will
have less impact on Title IX enforcement because HEW now shares en-
forcement power with the individual victim of discrimination.
HEW should welcome the Cannon decision as an opportunity to devote
more careful consideration to the grievances of those complainants who elect
to pursue the administrative remedy. Moreover, the administrative enforce-
ment scheme should not be abandoned. 147 Rather, complainants should be
afforded a meaningful alternative to the administrative procedure when
HEW's relief is ineffective or untimely.
CONCLUSION
The impact of the Cannon decision reaches beyond the scope of Title IX.
Implication of a private right of action raises questions regarding the proper
exercise of the judicial power. The fundamental inquiry is whether the
policies and purposes of the legislature are furthered by the implied remedy.
The standards elucidated in Cort v. Ash guided the Cannon Court in deter-
mining whether a Title IX private right of action should be implied. Cannon
not only implied a private right of action for Title IX complainants but may
have also clarified the existence of a private right of action under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Cannon recognizes the importance of the individual's role in charging sex
discrimination by allowing the Title IX complainant to be heard in federal
court. The decision acknowledges the effectiveness of a "back-to-basics" ap-
proach to securing equality for everyone by reaffirming the individual law-
suit as the classic vehicle for social progress. As a corollary, the Cannon
decision embodies a healthy realization of the limitations of an administrative
procedure as a remedy. HEW offered complainants only an empty promise
and offending institutions a fiscal threat. It is the individual private litigant
who offers the real promise for progress towards sex-based equality.
Madeleine Weldon-Linne
145. 20 U.S.C. § 3401 (1979).
146. Id.
147. The private right of action and administrative enforcement scheme can and should com-
plement each other. See, e.g., Terry v. Methodist Hosp., Civ. No. 76-373 (N.D. Ind. 1977),
where a federally financed hospital relocation plan was challenged. After the Terry complaint
was filed, HEW reviewed the hospital situation in the Gary area and asked the court to stay
proceedings until the investigation could be completed. Subsequently, a settlement was
reached.
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